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What is This?
THE HORNS OF THE DILEMMA
Race Mixing and the Enforcement of Jim Crow in New York City

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In early twentieth-century New York City, newly opened black-owned cabarets and hotels became important sites of cultural production for African American musicians and artists. White New Yorkers also began to frequent these establishments—to dance, drink, and socialize with African Americans. New York City’s most influential antivice organization, the Committee of Fourteen, sent its undercover investigators out to gather information on “race mixing.” City officials had delegated remarkable powers to the Committee of Fourteen, and the Committee used its power to push New York City’s black bourgeoisie into making a precarious bargain. The controversy over black-owned drinking establishments trapped black leaders in an untenable position, as they were forced to engage in trade-offs in the quest for both social equality and economic self-sufficiency. Ultimately, this debate demonstrates the way race was used as a marker of morality and how segregation was imposed in a state with strong antidiscrimination laws.

Keywords: segregation; leisure; undercover investigation; racism; W. E. B. Du Bois; Committee of Fourteen

Located in two neighboring brownstones in the heart of the Tenderloin district, Marshall’s Hotel featured live music, served a full menu, and attracted throngs of fashionable New Yorkers every night of the week. According to James Weldon Johnson, Marshall’s revolutionized social life for African Americans, who began to abandon the “old clubs farther downtown.” By 1900, Marshall’s was emerging as one of “the centres of a fashionable sort of life that hitherto had not existed” for black New Yorkers. Marshall’s was where the “actors, the musicians, the composers, the writers, and the better-paid vaudevil- lians” congregated; white actors and musicians also spent evenings there in the company of their black friends. Luminaries such as Rosamond and James Weldon Johnson, James Reese Europe, Paul Laurence Dunbar, Florenz Ziegfeld, and even W. E. B. Du Bois frequented the establishment. Marshall’s Hotel was not a gin-soaked, rat-infested, honky-tonk but an important gathering place for New York’s emerging black cultural elite.

D. Slattery, special assistant to the police commissioner, confirmed Marshall’s reputation in a written report to New York City’s most influential
antivice organization, the Committee of Fourteen. Composed mainly of reform-minded businessmen and clerics, the Committee of Fourteen aimed to suppress disorderly establishments by enforcing liquor laws. Slattery explained, “Marshall’s Hotel, 127/29 West 53rd Street operated under an unexpired Liquor Tax Certificate, in the name of James L. Marshall, a negro.”4 In his judgment, Marshall’s was “conducted in such a manner, that so far it has been impossible to obtain evidence sufficient to substantiate a charge of keeping a disorderly house. Everything possible is being done to prevent cause for complaint at this location.”5 Although Slattery offered assurance that the proprietor was abiding by the laws, the Committee of Fourteen continued to regard Marshall’s with suspicion for one reason: Marshall’s permitted race mixing. As Slattery noted, “white females frequent the place, with negroes, and it is also visited by white people, while slumming and sight seeing.”6

Marshall’s Hotel was not unique; rather, it was part of a new, emergent leisure culture. In early twentieth-century New York City, a large number of black-owned cabarets and hotels were opening, particularly in the Tenderloin, the theatre district, and Harlem. These spaces were important sites of cultural production for African American musicians and artists. Because of de facto segregation in New York City (despite strong civil rights provisions), they were also important simply as places for “respectable” black New Yorkers to meet up and mingle with friends. But even within the African American community, there were elements (religious in particular) that would have objected to Marshall’s—for its location in the notorious Tenderloin district and because it may have encouraged sexual licentiousness among young black men and women.7 In the same moment, white New Yorkers (particularly those of the bohemian or “sporting” persuasion) began to frequent such establishments—to hear jazz music, to dance, to drink, and to socialize with African Americans.8

However, Marshall’s situation did spark a heated debate. Marshall “succeeded in stirring up Professor Du Bois and Professor Springarn [sic],” and the public discussion that revolved around Marshall’s Hotel and his treatment by the Committee of Fourteen shows not only how way race was perceived and used as a marker of morality but also how segregation was imposed in a state with strong antidiscrimination laws.9 Racism was central to white progressive reform, but the arguments and strategies used by different sectors of the black community reveal the deep divisions over issues of integration, black ownership of commercial institutions, and commercial leisure in general.

The Committee of Fourteen’s perception of interracial mingling in the city was created through its undercover investigators’ reports, which consequently guided its agenda for black establishments. New York officials had delegated remarkable powers to the Committee of Fourteen, which in turn used the vagaries of liquor licensing as an occasion to spy on and regulate saloons and cabarets, especially those owned and frequented by African Americans. The
Committee had been searching for men of “the Booker T. Washington type” to assist in their goal of creating separate black and white drinking establishments and to head off criticism for this strategy. It subsequently created the Colored Auxiliary of the Committee of Fourteen (also known as the Committee of Seven) as an attempt to solve the city’s “Negro problem” in a manner that satisfied its moral aversion to race mixing. The sweep of the Committee’s powers pushed New York City’s black bourgeoisie (represented by Frederick R. Moore, editor of the New York Age) into making a precarious bargain. The controversy over black-owned drinking establishments trapped black leaders in an untenable position, as they were forced to engage in trade-offs in the quest for both social equality and economic self-sufficiency.

However, the Committee of Fourteen did not go unchallenged in its quest for a segregated leisure landscape. Despite his own worries about the moral condition of many African Americans, W. E. B. Du Bois rejected the Committee’s linking of race mixing with immorality, as well as its solution to those problems: voluntary segregation. This essay reveals the ways in which black and white progressive reformers worked around New York State’s civil rights laws to extend Jim Crow’s reach in New York City.

FAIR IN MORAL TONE: UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS OF MARSHALL’S HOTEL

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the “world of public amusements” was expanding and becoming big business. Whereas older forms of socializing had been regulated by membership (lodges, union halls, religious institutions, neighborhood saloons), the new commercial amusements of the early twentieth century contained no such restrictions. Rather, “‘going out’ meant laughing, dancing, cheering, and weeping with strangers with whom one might—or might not—have anything in common.” White, progressive organizations tried to provide alternatives to the city’s “cheap amusements.” For instance, in New York City, the People’s Institute and the settlement houses would host chaperoned, alcohol-free dances for the young men and women of the neighborhood. Of particular concern to one of the most prominent of these organizations, the Committee of Fourteen, was the growing popularity of black-white socializing.

In response to these seemingly chaotic changes, the Committee of Fourteen was organized in 1905 by a group of reform-minded business and community leaders. Their initial aim was the suppression of disorderly hotels and the enforcement of liquor laws in New York City. By 1911, the Committee had widened its scope, seeking to break the links between sex and commercialized leisure. For example, it was looking to shut down bars that permitted unaccompanied women in the barroom.
The Committee enacted its agenda mainly through economic pressure. It compiled a “protest list” that ranked establishments according to barroom conditions. If the Committee determined that a place was not run according to acceptable standards (which the members themselves defined), it would inform the brewers, who could decide to stop providing beer or revoke the liquor license altogether, thereby putting the proprietor out of business.  

In these protest list cases, the Committee made use of the conveniently vague laws regarding disorderliness. According to section 899-911 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings, “any person is disorderly who keeps a house or place used as a resort by prostitutes, drunkards, gamesters, habitual criminals or by other disorderly persons.” In addition, a “public nuisance” was defined by section 1530 of the Penal Law as “places which offend public decency, or injure the comfort, repose, health or safety of any considerable number of persons.” The imprecision of this language left the definition of the situation (such as what, precisely, constituted an offense to “public decency”) to the discretion of the Committee of Fourteen and its undercover investigators, who prowled through the city’s disreputable hotels, saloons, cabarets, brothels, and other assorted amusements in search of bad behavior.

On April 6, 1911, William F. Pogue, a black investigator, was sent to check up on several of the black-owned cabarets on the Committee of Fourteen’s protest list. He arrived at Marshall’s Hotel at about 1:15 a.m. after a few hours spent investigating and carousing elsewhere. Upon entering, he noticed that there were several white couples in the establishment, and “one of the white women was very much under the influence of drink. During the singing or playing she would get up and sing or try to dance.” Pogue could easily have concluded that this party was an offense to public decency and departed, but instead, he remained to chat with a young black woman who called him to her table.

Pogue bought a round of drinks for this woman, and she told him that “she came to Marshall’s often to solicit among the white patrons. She consented to take me to this hotel for a certain sum of money.” At this point, Pogue had evidence that prostitutes solicited in Marshall’s establishment, which was enough to mark the place as “disorderly.” Pogue, however, stayed. He bought more drinks for the prostitute, the change from which he “put . . . in one pocket.” After a while, his lady companion “excused herself.” After waiting “about a half hour for her to return,” Pogue realized that he was missing “three dollars from [his] pockets.” He wrote, “She had taken it and made her ‘get away’ she had been putting her arms around and over me and evidently that was her scheme to get it.”

Resigned, Pogue decided to leave. However, on his way out the door, he “met several friends coming in and was invited to go back in by them. Which I did I stayed there until 4:45 a.m. at that hour they were still dancing and drinks were being sold.” The fact that Pogue ran into friends coming into Marshall’s
suggests that this place was a part of his social milieu. This intersection of investigating tasks and personal social life is interesting; Pogue was able to condemn Marshall’s for still serving alcohol until nearly 5:00 in the morning, but there was no consternation or concern that he himself was engaged in disorderly behavior because the mantle of “investigator” protected him.

George Francis O’Neill, a white investigator for the Committee of Fourteen, arrived at different conclusions about the conditions at Marshall’s. To facilitate his investigative task, O’Neill adopted the persona of a white “slummer.” He hired a “touring car” and chauffeur for the evening because “in places of this character, the word ‘auto’ is the open sesame whereby evidences of a disorderly character are more readily obtained.”

Despite his best efforts to appear to be a habitué of clubs of this character, O’Neill was treated with suspicion at Marshall’s. He noted that they refused to serve him “at ten minutes of one,” and he was “duly informed that owing to the excise law [he] could get no intoxicating liquors.”

James Marshall, the proprietor, “would, from time to time, go about the place and look about same to see that no disorder would manifest itself.”

Had O’Neill not had the good fortune to run into Patrick, a black entertainer he knew, his “observations” may have stopped with the fact that Marshall was abiding by excise laws and patrolling the barroom to ensure that his patrons were behaving themselves. But when O’Neill attempted to buy Patrick a drink, the assistant manager called Patrick out into the hallway. When Patrick returned, he told O’Neill, “‘They were afraid of you, and didn’t want to let me drink with you, but I want to fix you right here; I told him you were all right. Let me introduce you to Marshall, so that when you come in again, everything will be all right.’” Patrick, by virtue of his color and reputation, was able to bring O’Neill into this inner sanctum, sanctioning him as “all right” and granting him “regular” status. In fact, O’Neill noted that “after Patrick had vouched for me, things seemed to brighten up in the place and Marshall contented himself by sitting down with a party of people.”

Shortly thereafter, “two negro men, a negro woman, who was holding a maudlin drunken man, entered and sat at a table near me, and the negro woman began to caress the white man.” Marshall did not intervene to put a stop to this behavior and therefore became guilty of running a disorderly establishment.

O’Neill concluded his report by stating that he had “entered Marshall’s thoroughly without prejudice . . . and the report I make is still without prejudice and I might say I consider the place fair in moral tone.” Although O’Neill was careful to insist that he was not prejudiced (thereby anticipating that any negative reports he generated on Marshall’s could be attributed to such an attitude), he did remark that “frankly, there were not evidences of disorder in the strict legal sense, but I have my own peculiar ideas of any place in which black and whites are entertained.” Indeed, so did the members of the Committee of Fourteen.
Race mixing was one of the disagreeable behaviors to which the investigators were attuned—and which the Committee required black proprietors to eliminate from their barrooms. As congressman and member of the Committee William S. Bennet explained, “If it is a colored place in which white people were not admitted at all,” then it “would seem to me that there is no chance for trouble at all.” For Bennet and other members of the Committee, the underlying concern with race mixing was that it made sexual activity across the color line possible. While the mingling of the races in public was not illegal, the Committee of Fourteen used its considerable unofficial power to enforce the separation of the races in public accommodations and amusements. The Committee effectively extended Jim Crow through a city that has not historically been thought of as a segregated place—in fact, in a city and state that had strong provisions against discrimination.

In 1873, New York State passed its first Civil Rights Act, which guaranteed “full and equal enjoyment of any accommodation, advantage, facility, or privilege furnished by public conveyances, innkeepers, theaters, public schools, or places of public amusement.” The laws of 1895 and 1905 expanded on the original act, granting all persons “full and equal rights and privileges” in all “places of public accommodation and amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens.”

By 1909, New York State had expanded the provisions of the 1905 law, making it one of the most extensive civil rights codes in the United States. The law included a wide range of facilities, including hospitals, amusement parks, schools, and restaurants. The Levy Law of 1913 amended the law of 1909, establishing that “accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges” cannot be “refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of race, creed, color or national origin.” Besides adding “creed,” the Levy Law instituted fines or prison sentences for anyone found guilty of violating these codes. Despite these extensive civil rights codes, the Committee of Fourteen found a way to enforce the separation of the races, which it imagined would restore moral order. The Committee of Fourteen’s agenda was part of a larger trend in New York City. By the end of 1913, the Carswell Act, preventing the marriage of blacks and whites, had been introduced in the New York State Legislature; the New York State Boxing Commission instituted a rule prohibiting blacks and whites from sparring in licensed boxing clubs; and the New York National Guard refused to start a black regiment.

Based on the social knowledge created by their undercover investigators’ reports, the members of the Committee of Fourteen had a picture of the brand of disorderliness at “protest list” establishments and tailored its responses and punishments accordingly. To be removed from the protest list, proprietors were required to attend a lecture by the executive or general secretary and sign a promissory note, which usually amounted to a promise to observe excise laws (prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages after 1 o’clock in the
morning). The content of these letters was modified to cover violations particular to the establishment in question.

But for black proprietors, they had to promise that they would serve blacks and whites in separate rooms or refuse service to whites altogether. For instance, in 1908, William Banks, the proprietor of a club at 206 West 37th Street, signed the Committee’s promissory note. After that, he noted in a letter to Whitin that he had “punctiliously adhered to the exclusion of the Caucasian and the Negro. I have not permitted them to mix. . . . I have, however, refused admittance invariably to either a colored man and a white woman or white man and colored woman.”36 The Committee of Fourteen used such tactics to mold a new racial order out of the rapidly changing demographics of New York City. Segregation would bring about moral order. But the members of the Committee suspected that they would encounter some opposition to their agenda, and so they attempted to find black allies to forestall opposition.

“UPLIFT” IDEOLOGY AND NEW YORK AGE

In September 1911, Whitin and other members of the Committee embarked on an outreach campaign to round up some African Americans of the “better class and reformer type.” Whitin had been casting about for black allies—to little avail—for a few years. In 1909, he wrote to Ruth Standish Baldwin, member of the Committee of Fourteen and personal friend to Booker T. Washington, expressing his concerns “as to how to treat fairly and wisely the troubled places of the Negroes.”37

Ruth Standish Baldwin was Whitin’s ad hoc adviser on all issues pertaining to African Americans in New York. His letters to her were candid—in that they expressed his confusion over how to deal with the “race problem”—in a way that his exchanges with race leaders were not. He remarked that there were “not many” African American establishments in New York, “but it is difficult to get satisfactory inspection and I find something of a sentiment, oh, well, they are niggers why trouble about them, either as to character or attempted cleaning up. This does not help me.”38

Whitin intimated that his white investigators were incapable of returning the necessary “evidence” of the immorality of these spaces, but that so long as these establishments were being run exclusively for African Americans, there would be no reason to waste his Committee’s limited resources. However, Whitin also suggested that to not attend to African American establishments would be untenable for him. But his solution to this moral quandary was the creation and maintenance of clean, orderly, single-race leisure establishments. Whitin appealed to Baldwin for help on this matter, asking her if she knew “any colored man in this City who is of the Booker T.
Washington type who would be willing to discuss the problem with me." Whitin assumed that a “Booker T. Washington type” would assist him in preventing race mixing in public accommodations and that this person would share the contention that “in all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress.” Whitin wanted to see separate barrooms and cabarets for blacks and whites—“separate as the fingers”—and he would like to work with this person, “one as the hand,” to enforce what amounted to Jim Crow–ism and outright racial discrimination.

Whitin and the Committee of Fourteen hoped that if they could announce to black proprietors that other black men found their establishment to be disorderly, then these offenders would believe that the Committee’s evidence was unimpeachable and would acquiesce to their demands. The members of the Committee also believed that black proprietors’ critiques of their policies were based on the fact that the Committee did not have enough black men to investigate black establishments and that that was the reason their evidence was skewed. The Committee did not comprehend that the criticism leveled by black New Yorkers was actually aimed at its overall social vision, which would introduce segregation to New York City’s leisure landscape. Thus, black allies, they supposed, would lend them credibility and authority in matters pertaining to black establishments.

Whitin began to devise a solution: he invited a few prominent African American men (some of whom had been recommended by Baldwin) to attend a meeting at the Committee of Fourteen’s offices. Among those invited were Dr. William Lewis Bulkley, who had founded the Committee for Improving the Industrial Condition of the Negro in New York in 1906, and Dr. W. H. Brooks, pastor of the St. Mark’s Methodist Episcopal Church and one of the founders of the National Urban League. Professor George Edmund Haynes, cofounder of the National Urban League, was also invited. But it was Fred R. Moore, editor of *New York Age*, who would become the Committee of Fourteen’s most valuable ally among “respectable” African Americans.

Under Moore’s editorship, *New York Age* expressed and exemplified a northern, urban version of the conservative social vision of Booker T. Washington, emphasizing concepts of self-sufficiency and uplift. In 1907, when Washington purchased *New York Age*, he appointed Moore editor. Critics quickly dismissed the paper and its editor as being entirely under the thumb of Washington. But although Moore was widely considered Washington’s right-hand man in New York, he was more independent than this characterization suggests and quite accomplished in his own right. Moreover, under Moore, *New York Age* developed into a widely influential newspaper within and beyond New York’s African American community, not merely an organ of Washingtonian thinking. James Weldon Johnson became an editor at *New York Age* in 1914, and from this position he “became an influential voice
both within the black community and as an interpreter of race relations to the
white community.”

By taking the point of view that there were some African Americans who
were better equipped to lead the race, New York Age emphasized the class
differences in New York’s black community. But in so doing, this segment of
the black bourgeoisie trapped itself in the tensions and contradictions of
“uplift” ideology. Uplift emphasized “self-help, racial solidarity, temper-
ance, thrift, chastity, social purity, patriarchal authority, and the accumula-
tion of wealth.” Class differentiation within the black community came to be
viewed by the black elite as a marker of “race progress.” These efforts to
point to the creation of a black bourgeoisie, one that mimicked the class
structure of white society but with none of the attendant material benefits,
was, as historian Kevin Gaines has observed, an attempt to supplant “the
racist notion of fixed biological racial differences with an evolutionary view
of cultural assimilation.”

For example, in January 1910, New York Age ran an editorial called “A
Fulfilled Need?” The author explained, “There are a hundred thousand
Negroes in Greater New York who do their shopping and attend the theater
who are likewise lost for places of first-class restaurant accommodations.”
Thus, for the African American bourgeoisie, not only was there a need for
more first-class accommodation, but there was also a need for places like
Marshall’s Hotel to be run according to the letter of the law so that they could
remain open. New York Age imagined that places like Marshall’s would
demonstrate to the Committee of Fourteen (and their allies in government, as
well as the insurance, business, social work, and social reform communities)
that African Americans were worthy of civil and political rights because they,
too, had a law-abiding segment of the population that had the financial
means to shop, attend the theater, and stay in nice hotels.

The coalescence of these impulses made Fred Moore an important ally in
the Committee of Fourteen’s campaign. While this alliance may have been a
shrewd one for particular African Americans in a particular moment, in this
instance it ended up being damaging, as it ultimately did not overthrow the
structure of racism but was instead handmaiden to it.

The Committee of Fourteen intended for the first meeting with its black
allies to address the issue of “saloons and hotels conducted by colored men,
or to which persons of that race resort.” Their guests would be presented with
“the reports . . . received from the investigators, of conditions found by
them.” The Committee hoped that “as a result of the conference and the
examination of these reports . . . a just and effective way will be determined
upon which to correct those conditions, which have been found objection-
able.” The result of this meeting was the creation of the Colored Auxiliary
of the Committee of Fourteen, also known as the Committee of Seven, with
Fred R. Moore at the helm.
On September 15, 1911, Walter G. Hooke, executive secretary of the Committee of Fourteen, wrote to Fred R. Moore that he “view[ed] with the greatest hope, the result of your meeting, and trust that you as a member of the committee in charge, will be able to impress upon the proprietors of the colored places, the necessity of maintaining decent conditions.” The Committee of Fourteen believed that someone of Moore’s stature in the African American community would be able to exert influence—by dint of his “position”—upon black proprietors.

But Hooke also felt compelled to assuage any fears Moore may have had of a racist program on the part of the Committee. Hooke wrote, “I think you know that our greatest protest against these places is in no sense due to the fact that they are kept by colored men. I consider, however, that young colored women and men of the community are entitled to the same safe guards, and protection that we try to provide for the white young women and men.” But these safeguards to the black community added up to protecting white men and women from black men and women. The Committee figured that it would be easier to convince African American proprietors to bar white patrons from their establishments if it were an African American issuing the edicts and enforcing the rules.

The Committee of Fourteen’s new associate committee aimed to “assist...in the work of regulating colored saloons and hotels.” The members were Fred R. Moore, chairman; Dr. P. A. Johnson; Dr. E. P. Roberts; Counselor James L. Curtis; and George Haynes. The Colored Auxiliary of the Committee of Fourteen planned to begin meeting regularly with Hooke early in September of 1913.

Moore gladly upheld his end of the bargain with the Committee of Fourteen by publicizing and explaining their joint effort. On November 2, 1911, New York Age ran an article on the front page titled “About Committee of Fourteen.” The article began with Hooke denying “that the committee is extending most of its efforts to the closing of colored saloons and hotels in New York City, and...declares that the Committee of Fourteen is devoting its attention to any and all saloons, etc., not conducted along respectable lines.” Hooke attempted to forestall any criticism issuing from black New Yorkers by stating that the Fourteen had been “more lenient with the colored saloon men and hotelkeepers than with the whites, as we fully realize that the colored people have less places to go to than the whites, and we have not objected to rathskellers run by Negroes, with music and singers, so long as the places were orderly and within the bounds of propriety.” Indeed, for the Committee of Fourteen, the “bounds of propriety” were demarcated by race.

Elements of New York’s black establishment initially responded positively to the Committee of Fourteen’s appeals to assist in controlling “disorderly Negroes”; the paradox for the Committee of Fourteen’s African American
allies, though, was that by cooperating with the Committee, they were complicit in expanding Jim Crow throughout New York City. By joining forces with the Committee of Fourteen, these black men were lending the imprimatur of “black New York” to this system of separate-but-equal leisure conditions. They tacitly accepted the Committee’s decision to ignore state civil rights laws and did not subscribe to the “slippery slope” of discrimination argument that W. E. B. Du Bois would raise in the following year. However, because the members of the Committee of Fourteen’s Colored Auxiliary perceived and explained the plans as “uplift,” as a service to the race, they did not perceive this as a traitorous alliance.

The key to understanding the position taken by Moore and other like-minded men lies in their understanding of the importance of black-owned businesses. The main tenets of uplift ideology—particularly this northern, urban variant—were leadership, moral stewardship, and business success. As such, the men of the Colored Auxiliary seized upon this unique opportunity presented by the Committee of Fourteen. They would be in charge of disciplining recalcitrant black saloonkeepers and encouraging those who maintained orderly establishments—those who represented a credit to the race.

Simultaneously, black saloonkeepers began to organize for their own protection and to control moral conditions in their saloons. On June 8, 1911, New York Age ran an article on the front page about the formation of the Negro Liquor Dealers Association of Greater New York. The piece stated that the “reform wave has struck the colored saloonkeepers of New York City and Brooklyn.” The “principal reason for organizing is to put the saloon business on a higher plane and command more respect from the public.” The first meeting of the association was held on Monday, June 5, 1911, at John W. Connor’s Royal Café at 2275 Seventh Avenue in Harlem. Other proprietors in attendance were Gib Young, Barron D. Wilkins, Walter Herbert (of the Criterion Café), and Leroy Wilkins, among others.

The black men who created this organization owned and operated popular cabarets and casinos in New York City. Not coincidentally, the Committee of Fourteen had frequently investigated their establishments. For example, Barron D. Wilkins signed his promissory note in 1909, which stated that he would not “admit male whites to any part of the licensed premises to which colored women are admitted; That [he would] not at any time admit any white women.” Herbert and Young’s establishments were also under the Committee’s periodic surveillance.

By December 1911, the “colored saloon men” were meeting with the Committee of Seven to arrive at mutually agreeable conditions. New York Age ran an article on the front page titled “To Raise the Moral Tone of Local Saloons: New York Colored Saloonmen to Organize to Better Conditions: Conference Held Saturday: Associate Committee to the Committee of Fourteen to Co-operate with Saloonkeepers.” The article reported that the two
groups—the Colored Saloonmen and the Committee of Seven—pledged to cooperate with one another and that “there was not a saloon man present who did not express a desire to eliminate some of the features that have been declared objectionable by the Committee of Fourteen.” Although the article did not explicitly state those conditions, implicit was that these saloon men would maintain establishments for “their race” only.

In particular, the black proprietors of Harlem pledged to “make an effort to decrease the number of drunks among colored men.” These black businessmen were fighting for the moral uplift of black New Yorkers from behind the beer taps. The tasks of racial uplift and Washingtonian self-sufficiency coalesced in Harlem barrooms, as the Negro Liquor Dealers Association also hoped to ameliorate the “tendency of Negroes to support saloons and other business enterprises managed and owned by whites in Harlem... and plans will be made to equalize this support among the colored business institutions.”

But this relationship between the Committee of Fourteen, their Colored Auxiliary, and the Negro Liquor Dealers was an uneasy one and resulted in a Faustian bargain for the neighborhood of Harlem in particular. While the Committee of Fourteen was still driving the agenda by insisting that the separation of the races in saloons and leisure spaces was a way to prevent immoral behavior, the “colored saloon men” seized upon this opportunity to encourage black New Yorkers to support black businesses. Through cooperation and voluntary action, the black proprietors believed that they, too, could benefit if they helped the Committee of Fourteen solve the “problem” of race mixing. The black proprietors sought to use this situation to encourage, create, and maintain more black-owned, -operated, and -patronized drinking establishments.

While the Committee of Fourteen wanted to create and maintain single-race leisure establishments in the interest of morality, the Negro Liquor Dealers Association seized on this moment to create more opportunities for black business ownership. While the goals seem similar on the surface, the ideological underpinnings of those goals were not. The black saloon owners understood themselves as taking up the mantle of reformer; from behind the bar, they would police the moral conditions of their patrons and their neighborhood, and this ought to, in effect, broadcast to white New York that African Americans were moral, upright people who were worthy of equal civil, political, and social rights.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AS A MEANS OF STOPPING IMMORALITY: W. E. B. DU BOIS AND THE COMMITTEE OF FOURTEEN

The Committee of Fourteen and its African American allies had struck a tenuous balance, one in which the goals of each group were being met. White
patrons would be kept out of black-owned establishments, which satisfied the Committee’s goal of a voluntarily segregated leisure landscape. The Negro Liquor Dealers Association took this as an opportunity to consolidate the power of African Americans in commercial ventures in Harlem. Frederick Whitin and Walter Hooke must have breathed a sigh of relief, believing that, finally, they had the situation under control. However, in September 1911, W. E. B. Du Bois contacted Frederick Whitin regarding his treatment of James Marshall.

For Du Bois, Whitin and the Committee of Fourteen represented a very powerful force in New York City; as a group of supposedly “progressive” New Yorkers, they were pursuing a retrograde segregationist policy that stood in the way of the work of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). In addition, they had teamed up with a visible group of African Americans, which was lending its imprimatur to this racist program.

Du Bois explained in his first letter to the Committee of Fourteen that he had been going to Marshall’s Hotel for nearly ten years and that he considered it to be “a well run hotel, and on the whole as it seemed to me improving.” He was confused as to why the Committee of Fourteen had refused to recommend Marshall’s for liquor license renewal, explaining that “as compared with other hotels in New York, white and colored, it seems to me that Marshall is unusually well run, and as a patron who is loathe to lose about the only place where a colored man downtown can be decently accommodated, I would be very glad to know the reason for the Committee’s action.”

Du Bois implied that the grounds for the Committee’s recommendation was made not because of actual conditions at Marshall’s Hotel but was perhaps motivated by something else, something unseemly.

One year later, Du Bois contacted Frederick Whitin and the Committee of Fourteen on the subject of Marshall’s, reiterating the points made in his earlier letter. In addition, he said that he was “sorry to hear” that the Committee was still refusing to recommend Marshall for a liquor license and wanted to know “if this decision of the Committee is because of any violation of the law on Mr. Marshall’s part or is it for other reasons.”

The following day, Whitin replied to Du Bois. He argued that the problems at Marshall’s were not of the kind “which the casual diner in the place might observe.” One might think that the pioneering black sociologist would have powers of observation superior to those of the casual diner, but Whitin proceeded to elucidate the Committee’s logic anyway. He explained that Marshall’s was “a place which if it could be conducted for either your race or mine, undoubtedly would not be objectionable. In addition to being on the border line of entertainment places, it has that unfortunate mixing of the races which when the individuals are of the ordinary class, always means danger.”

Whitin operated from the assumption that he and Du Bois would be of the same opinion on the subject of the “common classes” because of their own respectable class positions. For Whitin, the main issue at Marshall’s was that
black and white patrons were allowed to sit together, were served together, were dancing together; he assumed that Du Bois would agree with him.

Du Bois replied, explaining that “if the objections against Mr. Marshall’s place are on account of the races being served together there as you say in your letter, then the Committee of Fourteen is seeking to violate the laws of the State of New York, which expressly declare that discrimination between races must not be made in places of public entertainment.” He then warned Whitin that he would be gathering “further information on the subject,” as he was “loathe to believe that the Committee of Fourteen is ready to take any such illegal position.”

Whitin expressed surprise and confusion that Du Bois did not share his position, yet he remained stubborn in his convictions. He believed that he possessed “true” and accurate information pertaining to Marshall’s because of the information gathered by his investigators—and because he believed that he was doing a service to the black race by attempting to clean up “their” lower class.

Whitin explained to Du Bois that in negotiations with Marshall, he held the position that if Marshall (indeed all African American proprietors brought into his office) were to refuse service to white patrons, his establishment would be removed from the protest list. Whitin continued, expressing surprise at the position Du Bois was taking: “With regard to the law of discrimination the point which you suggest is rather the reverse of the ordinary, a discrimination against the white man. The law was passed as I understand it to secure justice to the members of the negro race and was not intended to be used as a means to permit that which both races agree is objectionable.” Whitin saw the civil rights laws as a step toward the erosion of moral order in New York City, as something that would permit (and perhaps encourage) mixed-race sociability like never before. But it is on this point that Whitin erred; he seemed to think that because the Colored Auxiliary was willing to help him separate the races, they shared his point of view. But Whitin had made another mistake when he conflated the ideological position of the Colored Auxiliary with that of Du Bois.

Du Bois responded with horror to Whitin’s interpretation of the state laws. He pointed out that “the state law in question is not simply to protect colored men, it is to prevent discrimination on account of race or color and has been invoked in behalf of white men and sustained by the courts.” Whitin countered that Du Bois’s logic was the same as that used by desperate proprietors. Whitin cited the “the hotel law [which] requires hotel keepers to admit all persons who are in proper condition and able to pay for the accommodation.” Hotel keepers, however, were not supposed to admit unaccompanied women, and Whitin pointed out that that “could also be called an unlawful discrimination.” On the same grounds, Whitin rejected Du Bois’s interpretation of the antidiscrimination laws.
Du Bois attempted to enlighten Whitin on the meaning of discrimination. He explained, “It would be illegal for your Committee to force any colored man to refuse to entertain white persons in his place of business or compel any colored man to promise any such discrimination. The law does not prevent discrimination on grounds other than race or color.” Du Bois then remarked that if the Committee continued to pursue this policy, “the matter will not be allowed to rest where it is.”78 Whitin realized that, despite the cooperation of the Colored Auxiliary, he truly had a problem with the “colored” race. He imagined that his position would have been simple to enforce: make Marshall and other black proprietors stop serving white people and then leave the problem of immorality in the black community to black leaders.

Whitin replied to Du Bois, asking if they could meet to discuss the problem at length. In terms of discrimination and immorality, Whitin explained that he saw the issue as “a question of which of the two laws is more important.” As such, the solution was quite simple for Whitin. He attempted to set out his reasoning for Du Bois, arguing that “if we find that the association of the two races under certain conditions results in disorderly conditions and their separation results in a discrimination based on race or color, we must choose between the horns of the dilemma. I naturally hold a brief for the point that disorderly is worse than discrimination. It seems to me that you will hold a brief for discrimination.”79

In the worldview of Whitin and his cohort in the Committee of Fourteen, the ultimate concern was with sexual immorality. Whitin and the Committee of Fourteen thus believed that if they could prevent black and white men and women from mingling in places where alcohol was served and dancing encouraged, they could make one large step forward in cleaning up the city.

Du Bois replied to Whitin, stating that he would be glad to have a conversation on “the question of racial discrimination as a means of stopping immorality.”80 The phrasing of this casts light on the fact that Whitin was willing to break civil rights laws to end “immorality.” Du Bois explained that while he, too, wished “to reduce the immoral conditions in New York to a minimum among all people,” he was only willing to cooperate with the Committee of Fourteen “if Marshall’s or Rector’s or any other restaurant in New York is breaking the law or encouraging illegal or immoral conditions.”81 And then, he concluded, such offending proprietors should have their establishments “closed or improved,” not pushed into violating antidiscrimination laws.

However, Du Bois was not persuaded by Whitin’s evidence that Marshall’s was especially immoral and thus worthy of being denied a license. He stated, “I do not believe that discrimination between races in places of public entertainment makes for morality, or even if it does, it is against the law and the laws are made by the legislature and not by individuals.”82

This hits at the heart of the criticisms leveled at the Committee of Fourteen, particularly by African Americans. The Committee of Fourteen,
composed mainly of businessmen and clerics, wielded considerable power within the city and the state to push its own moral agenda. Even with the money and influence James Marshall possessed within his own community and social set, there was no way he could go up against the Committee on his own. He was eventually forced to knuckle under to the Committee’s considerable pressure, as is evidenced by his promissory note.

Du Bois refused to accept that black proprietors should be forced to institute a policy of discrimination. While he agreed that immorality was a problem, he did not see this immorality as a direct result of black and white people socializing in the same establishments. Moreover, he pointed to the fact that, despite New York State laws, Jim Crow lived in New York; there were few establishments where people of his stature and race could have a meal. Sure, juke joints were available to black New Yorkers. But would Du Bois take someone like Jane Addams there for dinner? Or even go there himself?

In the final extant letter between Du Bois and Whitin, Whitin promised to telephone Du Bois so they could meet to discuss “how this Committee can correct the conditions which it was organized to suppress and yet to avoid as far as possible other unfortunate conditions of equal or less danger.”83 Here, Whitin tipped his hand: discrimination, he conceded, was an unfortunate condition but surely not as deleterious to American society as “immorality,” which, in this case, functioned as code for “miscegenation.” This is the final word in the debate between these two men; it is unclear whether they ever met personally or what might have occurred.

Despite Du Bois’s intervention, James Marshall finally succumbed to the Committee’s pressures in October 1912. He was summoned to the office of the Committee of Fourteen’s general secretary Frederick Whitin, where he was presented with the damning evidence and forced to submit to a humiliating lecture on how to improve conditions in his establishment.

The next day, Marshall sent a follow-up letter, in which he consented to “live up to the said agreement.” In addition, he agreed: “The dining rooms to remain the same exclusively for colored people. Where the 2 large private dining rooms are they will be made into one large room for private dancing and entertainment exclusively for my white patrons only. . . . We will have and run a strictly first class place for the Negro as well as one for the whites—hoping that this will meet with your approval.”84 This agreement did not ask Marshall to refuse service to anyone but merely had him provide “separate but equal” accommodations; thus, it avoided direct violation of New York State’s civil rights laws. Because of the considerable power the Committee of Fourteen wielded with the brewers and insurance companies, men like Marshall—otherwise wealthy, successful, powerful businessmen—were left in powerless positions. Marshall had to agree to the Committee’s terms or risk having his liquor license revoked, which would have put him out of business.

Marshall’s promissory note (and those signed by other black proprietors) resulted in the forced separation of the races in public accommodations, in part
because of the cooperation of the Colored Auxiliary and the Negro Liquor Dealers Association.

In 1914, New York Age ran an editorial titled “Too Many Saloons in Harlem.” The author estimated that 70 saloons existed in Harlem, where forty thousand black people resided, but black proprietors operated only about nine of these establishments. The author blamed white saloon keepers who would “lend [patrons] money to buy all you want to drink in his place” for the poor moral conditions in Harlem. The article referred to white saloon keepers’ practice of allowing patrons to run a tab: “The bigger the ‘tab’ he lets you run the better you like him. Consequently, there are many ‘popular’ white saloonkeepers.” The author’s conclusion was that white proprietors needed to be driven out of Harlem. According to this author, “The white dealer in liquor has no interest in the morals of our women,” and for this reason, these white saloon keepers should be “put out of business, or be compelled to change their ways to an appreciable extent.” For this author, the benefit of having black men running businesses in and for the black community was that these individuals would presumably have a vested interest in the moral health of the neighborhood and community. Thus, they would be willing to “see to it that conditions are greatly improved and that less temptations are put in the way of unsophisticated young men and women.” For this author, running a bar in Harlem was a race enterprise, and all should have felt the ethical imperative to police the patrons and provide a space where the best moral conditions could thrive (never mind that good moral conditions may have meant smaller receipts at the end of the night). Indeed, given the influence of the Committee of Fourteen, running or patronizing a drinking establishment in New York City in the early twentieth century was a political exercise.

The Committee of Fourteen’s annual report of 1913 explained that with the assistance of Fred Moore and the Committee of Seven, the executive secretary was continuing to be “advised in his regulation of places conducted by colored men, by members of that race interested in the Committee’s problems.” The report concluded, “Such places as were purely dives have been eliminated, and the remaining saloons are being conducted in a much more respectable manner.”

Aside from this brief mention, there is little correspondence and few records from the Committee of Seven. Was this auxiliary merely the Committee of Fourteen’s attempt to add an air of authenticity to its program for the “Negro sections” of the city? This seems to be true, as is evidenced by the fact that the annual report noted that black men interested in “the Committee’s problems” were offering their assistance. Still, the criticism that continued to be levied at the Committee of Fourteen by African Americans points to the fact that African Americans in New York did not share a unified opinion on the matter.

Gilchrist Stewart, Chairman of the New York Vigilance Committee of the New York Branch of the NAACP, became embroiled in a conflict with the Committee of Fourteen over an establishment owned by Gibeon L. Young
(of the Negro Liquor Dealers Association). The Committee of Fourteen had charged that Young’s establishment was disorderly. Stewart’s Committee disagreed with the Committee of Fourteen’s assessment, and as a result, it conducted its own investigations of the Young establishment, “both in the night, day, evening and early morning between one and five, for seven consecutive nights.” Stewart maintained that the Vigilance Committee’s investigation was an “impartial one,” and thus its information represented what was truly going on at Young’s.

Stewart charged that the “character of a colored man which you could hire to act as a stool pigeon to secure evidence of a colored place” would be entirely suspect. Such a man, according to Stewart, “would have to be a detective and you know what detectives do when you hire them. They get the kind of evidence they think their employer wants. They either are broke or think a certain kind of evidence is necessary to the security of their employment.” Stewart saw an important distinction between men of the race who worked as paid investigators and men who would engage in such work for the benefit of the entire race—such as the investigators for his Vigilance Committee. In addition, Stewart asserted that Young was “a public spirited man whose place of amusement you are closing up and bankrupting upon the word of some colored paid investigators whose testimony would not be worth two cents to an impartial jury.”

Fred Moore was aware of the “stool pigeon” charge being made against the Committee of Fourteen’s investigators. On July 2, 1913, he drafted a letter to be sent out to all offending black saloon keepers, which he forwarded to Hooke to have typed up, copied, and returned to him for his signature. The letter explained that “living up to the rules laid down” was of utmost importance. Moore continued, “A voluntary cooperation is preferred to our having to resort to punishment, or you to be closed because you do not comply with the reasonable requests we have made of you from time to time.”

On the issue of stool pigeons, Moore argued that proprietors could “be the means of doing away with stool pigeons as they are called.” He continued, “By exercising strength of character sufficient to convince your patrons that indecency is not going to be permitted—no complaints would then be made against you and your records would be a guarantee of proper treatment. . . . The Committee of Fourteen only asks that you conduct your places decently, remember, no colored place has been closed and many white places have been; and the warnings given them have been fewer than those given you.”

Hooke had crossed out the “stool pigeons” comment in the draft of the letter he received. In his reply to Moore, he explained that the letter needed some changes before it could be sent out. The Committee of Fourteen may have been willing to cooperate with African Americans and delegate some responsibilities; giving up the undercover investigators, however, was out of the question.
Despite Gilchrist Stewart and Fred Moore’s concerns regarding stool pigeons, undercover investigation was integral to the enforcement of the Committee of Fourteen’s racial program. For them, it was not enough to send an observer (as Stewart’s Committee had done) into an establishment to check up on the moral conditions. The Committee seemed to operate on the logic that if conditions could be created, not merely observed, then proprietors were violating its policies.

For example, investigator David Oppenheim was sent to investigate black-owned and -patronized establishments in Brooklyn. At Chadwick’s Novelty Café, he “knocked at door, colored man on inside motioned me to go away.” Oppenheim noted, “Perhaps this would have deterred an ordinary white patron, but not Oppenheim. He asked the bouncer to send out his boss. Oppenheim noted, “A few minutes later a colored man came out. I said to him I have been here several times and I don’t see why you don’t let me in, he said we don’t let any white men in here unless we know them.” Oppenheim persisted, quite possibly to see if he could get Chadwick to break his agreement to not serve white patrons.

Oppenheim continued, “I told him I could go to any colored place in Harlem and they would let me in I mentioned Baron Wilkins, Leroys and a few others. . . . He said he was not acquainted with the people in Harlem and that he couldn’t take any chances on letting me in.” Oppenheim tried everything, short of force or bribery, to get in that door. Chadwick replied, “I don’t doubt you are all right but I can’t let you in unless some one I know introduces you.” Oppenheim asked Chadwick if he ever let white men in; Chadwick said, “he lets some white men in but they are friends of his that used to go to school with him.”

The Committee of Fourteen had found a tool to prevent race mixing in commercial amusements: economic pressure and fear. Black proprietors were being forced to bend to the Committee’s demands or risk losing their licenses (and thereby their livelihoods). Thus, men like Chadwick were being forced to run all-black establishments, even if it did not suit them personally. Black businessmen had been made unwitting and unwilling hosts to Jim Crow.

NOTES

2. Johnson, Black Manhattan, 118-19.
4. D. Slattery to Frederick Whitin, September 28, 1908, Box 1, Folder 7, Committee of Fourteen Records, Rare Books and Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library (hereafter C14).
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

8. For important discussions of “slumming” and “race mixing” in urban leisure establishments, see Chad Heap, “‘Slumming’: Sexuality, Race, and Urban Commercial Leisure, 1900-1940” (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2000); and Kevin J. Mumford, *Interzones: Black/White Sex Districts in Chicago and New York in the Early Twentieth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

9. Frederick Whitin to Ruth Baldwin, November 15, 1912, Box 2, Folder 10 “General Correspondence 1912 November 1-15,” C14.


12. In *Black Manhattan*, James Weldon Johnson distinguishes between gambling clubs, honky-tonsks, and professional clubs. He defines the professional clubs as establishments that “nourished . . . artistic effort.” He notes that these places were “the rendezvous of the professionals, their satellites and admirers. Several of these clubs were famous in their day and were frequented not only by blacks, but also by whites.” He lists the Criterion and Barron Wilkins, among others (pp. 74-75).

13. Mara L. Keire explains that in New York, “the mechanics of licensing required that each alcohol retailer pay the Excise Department $1,200 for its liquor license and then take out an additional bond of $1,800 from a surety company to cover penalties incurred during the revocation or forfeiture of the license.” Because these fees were too high for ordinary saloon keepers to pay on their own, “breweries often owned the building, held a chattel mortgage on the bar fixtures, or fronted the money for the excise tax certificate and bond. When a brewer subsidized the license, the saloon keeper usually signed over power of attorney to the brewer.” As such, saloon keepers were susceptible to pressure from many sides—and the Committee of Fourteen used this to their advantage. “Vice in American Cities, 1890-1925” (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2002), 42-43.


16. Ibid., 22.


18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. William S. Bennet to Walter Hook [sic], December 24, 1910, Box 1, Folder 1, C14. I have rearranged the order of this quote for clarity’s sake, but the logic remains the same.
36. William Banks to Frederick Whitin, August 24, 1908, Box 1, Folder “General Correspondence: 1908, July-December,” C14.
37. Whitin to Baldwin, August 31, 1909, Box 1, Folder 12 “General Correspondence, August 1909,” C14. Ruth Baldwin was a member of the Research Committee of the Committee of Fourteen and the National League for the Protection of Colored Women. She was also the widow of William H. Baldwin, Jr., who had served on the Committee of Fifteen and was president of the Long Island Railroad before his death. Baldwin was also a major contributor to and trustee of Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee Institute.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
41. Mrs. Baldwin did not immediately deliver that Washingtonian helpmate to Whitin. One year later, Whitin again contacted Baldwin on the “race issue.” In a letter dated August 10, 1910, he gently reminded her that “a year ago I had special difficulty in the matter of blacklisting the colored places. Among these places was one that was especially notorious as being a resort not merely for colored people, but also for whites.” Whitin also noted that the National Negro Business League will be “held in this city next week. Dr. Washington, as its president, will be in town. . . . I would like very much to see Dr. Washington on the subject.” Box 10, Folder “Baldwin, Mrs. Wm. H.,” C14. On August 14, 1910, Booker T. Washington wrote to “my dear Mrs. Baldwin” and begged off on direct involvement with the Committee of Fourteen, citing a busy schedule, but also stating that he had “to bear in mind that I am not a citizen of New York and that I should not ‘dabble’ in many of these matters which are purely local. Anything that I can do, of course, to aid the work you are engaged in I am always willing to do, but purely local questions I think I ought not to take up.” Booker T. Washington to Ruth Baldwin, Box 10, Folder “Baldwin, Mrs. William H.,” C14.
42. Dr. William Lewis Bulkley was born in slavery in 1861 in South Carolina. He earned a PhD at Syracuse University and moved to New York City in the 1890s. He worked as a teacher in New York City public schools and eventually became a school principal. Bulkley was a pragmatist and tried to address “conditions in the city as he saw them and tried to improve them immediately as best he could.” He was acquainted with Ruth Baldwin through the National League for the Protection of Colored Women. Gilbert Osofsky, *Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1996), 50, 64.
46. Moore knew Ruth Standish Baldwin from the National League for the Protection of Colored Women, of which he was chair in 1910, and through his involvement with the Commission for Improving the Industrial Conditions of Negroes in New York and the National League on Urban Conditions Among Negroes. Guichard Parris and Lester Brooks, *Blacks in the City: A History of the National Urban League* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 9-10, 33, 62. Moore was also the general manager of the National Negro Business League, a partner in the Afro-American Realty Company, and in March 1913, he was appointed minister and consul general to Liberia (although he resigned shortly after taking his oath of office).
49. Ibid., 3.
51. Whitin to Bulkley, September 2, 1911, Box 1, Folder 18 “General Correspondence, September 1911,” C14.
52. Ibid.
53. Hooke to Fred R. Moore, September 15, 1911, Box 1, Folder 18 “General Correspondence, September 1911,” C14.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Moore letter, forwarded to Hooke, July 2, 1913, Box 2, Folder 20 “General Correspondence 1913 July,” C14. Perhaps not surprisingly, Lucien H. White, the theatre and arts reporter from the *New York Age*, began to work as an undercover investigator for the Committee in 1914. Box 28, Folder “1914,” C14.
58. “About Committee of Fourteen,” *New York Age*, November 2, 1911. In the original article, all of the w’s were printed as y’s. I have made the appropriate changes for ease of reading.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. “Saloonkeepers Organize,” *New York Age*, June 8, 1911.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid. For Wilkins’ promissory note dated September 23, 1909, for his saloon at #253 West 35th, see David E. Tobias to Walker [sic] G. Hooke, September 12, 1910, Box 15, Folder “Tobias, David Elliot,” C14.
65. Present were Fred R. Moore, Dr. E. P. Roberts, Counselor James L. Curtis, and Dr. P. A. Johnson for the Committee of Fourteen, and the saloon men were represented by Barron Wilkins, G. L. Young, J. W. Connor, William Banks, and J. H. Press.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. W. E. B. Du Bois to William Bennet, September 23, 1911, Box 11, Folder “W. E. B. Du Bois Correspondence,” C14. There is no reply to this letter in the Committee’s records.
72. Ibid.
74. Whitin wrote a letter about his exchange with Du Bois to Committee member Ruth Standish Baldwin. He wrote that he needed “to confer with you upon the perennial problem of the proper treatment of the colored race.” Frederick Whitin to Ruth Baldwin, November 15, 1912, Box 2, Folder 10 “General Correspondence 1912 November 1-15,” C14.
76. Du Bois to Whitin, October 18, 1912, Box 2, Folder “General Correspondence 1912 October 1-20,” C14.
78. Du Bois to Whitin, October 18, 1912, Box 2, Folder “General Correspondence 1912 October 1-20,” C14.
79. Whitin to Du Bois, October 12, 1912, Box 2, Folder “General Correspondence 1912 October 21-31,” C14.
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